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Hiding a Mortgage Too Well 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
The concept of a hidden mortgage is easy enough to understand, as far as the motivation for 
creating one is concerned, but its actual operation is often far more difficult to grasp. Garcia v 
Roberts (2009) 173 CA4th 900, 93 CR3d 286, reported at p 132, is a good illustration of that 
(which I will get to after a short introductory digression). 
Mortgage law starts with the idea that there may be superior equities in the transaction that can 
often trump the actual language in the document, and that those equities cannot be waived by 
further fancy language in the document. When a mortgage is involved, a court will “look 
through” the form of the transaction to get to its substance and, consequently, not pay much 
attention to the literal language of the actual provisions in it. (The best illustration of this 
principle is the statement in CCP §744 that a mortgage “whatever its terms” always has to be 
foreclosed.) 
The doctrines of superior equities and rules against clogging (prohibiting the inclusion of 
provisions that impair the borrower’s right of redemption) are often frustrating for those whose 
income comes from negotiating deal terms, as well as for those who believe in freedom of 
contract even when it allows a lender to collect its pound of flesh, if that was what the deal called 
for. Mortgage creditors can be quite upset to discover that they spent a lot of money and time 
demanding and drafting provisions they were later unable to enforce. 
One way for a creditor to avoid the inconveniences of mortgage law is to take advantage of the 
fact that ordinary contracts that do not amount to mortgages are not subject to those same 
principles. A simple contract is interpreted according to its terms and the intention of the parties, 
except in special cases such as fraud or adhesion. That means that if a clever attorney can 
blindside a court into thinking that it has before it an ordinary contract transaction rather than a 
mortgage transaction, he or she may be able to get away with a far better result for the client. 
(After all, for over 75 years, California courts were fooled into thinking that deeds of trust were 
not mortgages, thereby allowing lenders a good long time to avoid otherwise unpleasant 
mortgage rules.) 
There is no doubt in my mind that the deal in Garcia v Roberts was, in fact, a hidden 
mortgage. But it was so well concealed that I am not sure that anyone—neither lawyers nor the 
judges, nor even the parties—realized it. The positions taken and the rulings made—whether the 
deal involved an oral loan agreement or a written lease option, whether a cause of action for one 
could be added to the other at a later time, whether one of those theories could complement or 
supersede the other, whether and how the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds had an 
impact, the effect of the expiration of the option date, an optionor’s duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, plus many other rather bizarre twists and turns in the case—all arose because everyone 
attempted to analyze the transaction as it had been literally concocted by the parties. Because of 
that approach, I do not believe that the opinion makes much sense or is likely to ever be cited by 
another court or relied on by another attorney; the opinion and the “actual facts” on which it 
relies are just too complicated to be useful. 
A Camouflaged Purchase Money Loan 
From my perspective, however, the case is an intriguing one, with useful cautions for those 
who borrow or loan money. The deal was simply a camouflaged purchase money loan 
transaction. Garcia, the borrower, started out having an option to purchase property that he had 
been renting, but lacked the $132,500 necessary to exercise that option and complete the 
purchase. This led him to seek to borrow that amount from his friend, Roberts. In an ordinary 
transaction, Roberts might have merely advanced that money to Garcia directly for Garcia to buy 
the property, and then taken back a deed of trust on it when Garcia acquired title to it. Instead, 
Roberts gave the money directly to the seller and took title himself, giving Garcia a two-year 
lease on the property together with an option to purchase it from Roberts when that lease ended. 
Since the monthly payments Garcia had to make to Roberts during the lease period were 
expressly stated to amount to 12 percent of the purchase price that Roberts had paid the seller, 
there was no doubt that they were interest payments on the loan rather than rent payments under 
a lease. This sale and leaseback was a mortgage arrangement, with the added twist that title to 
the property went to the lender from a third party seller rather than from the borrower—a twist 
that makes this mortgage transaction one of purchase money rather than a refinance. 
If the judges had appreciated that this was a mortgage loan, they would have said that Roberts 
held title to the property both in trust and as security for a loan to Garcia. The trust is a resulting 
trust because Garcia was really the one who paid the price (by way of using funds he had 
borrowed from Roberts). But while Roberts held his title only in trust, he was nevertheless 
entitled to have his loan to Garcia repaid out of the property, making that trust a security device 
or equitable mortgage securing his loan. That was the real deal, rather than the phony 
paperworked or oral versions the parties bickered about. 
If, in fact, this was a mortgage loan between Roberts and Garcia, it would not matter whether 
it was structured as an oral agreement or a written lease and option. In any case, Garcia would be 
entitled to assert his equity of redemption and pay his debt late, i.e., after the date stated in the 
lease option or the date for payment declared in the loan agreement had passed. Mortgage 
debtors always get extra time to “redeem” themselves. 
Remedies 
Characterization as a mortgage would also bear on the remedies issues, now awaiting a new 
trial. The traditional remedy would be to allow Garcia to assert his right of redemption (i.e., 
exercise the original option) and obtain title to the property by repaying Roberts the $133,027 
(including closing costs) he had borrowed from him. The earlier trial court judgment had instead 
awarded damages to Garcia of $367,000, based on a breach of contract theory. That result 
appears premised on the assumption that Roberts keeps the title he has and Garcia recovers the 
benefit of the bargain he would have obtained by purchasing property worth $500,000 for only 
$133,000. (Fraud was also found, but that finding did not appear to have been used to increase 
Roberts’s liability.) The alternate recoveries work out the same way economically, given a debt 
of $133,000 and a market value of $500,000. Ordinarily, Roberts would not be able to elect to 
keep the property and pay Garcia damages, since that would amount to a strict foreclosure 
combined with a damage kicker. But I suppose that Garcia can elect to treat Roberts’s behavior 
as constituting a wrongful foreclosure and choose to take his recovery as damages rather than as 
rescission and restitution. As I say, the numbers work out the same either way. 
Before I read this decision, it had never occurred to me that an unintended virtue of deciding 
that a contract transaction constituted a mortgage in disguise was that it could save the lawyers 
and the judges from the near-impossible task of attempting to literally interpret or enforce that 
otherwise incomprehensible contract language. This whole case would have been a lot simpler if 
that fact had only been appreciated. 
 
Garcia v Roberts (2009) 173 CA4th 900, 93 CR3d 286 
The published portion of this decision discusses whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
granting a substituted plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (to conform to the proof) by 
adding a breach of written contract claim. The breach of written contract claim conflicted with 
the deposition testimony of plaintiff Johnny Garcia, who died before trial. The substituted 
plaintiff (his wife, Omega Garcia) prevailed at trial on all causes of action, including a claim of 
fraud. The court of appeal vacated that part of the judgment awarding damages to plaintiff on the 
cause of action for breach of written contract, but affirmed the other orders and judgment of the 
trial court. 
The dispute arose out of Johnny Garcia’s attempt to purchase real property, including a 
mobilehome, that he had been renting for $500 per month from the Sasashima Family Trust. 
Garcia lived in the mobilehome and operated from there a modest business as a backhoe 
operator. In 2001, Garcia reached an agreement with the Trustee of the Trust for an option to 
purchase the property for $140,000. Under the agreement, Garcia paid $7500 to the Trust and 
had two years to come up with the balance. The $7500 would be treated as a downpayment and 
Garcia would continuing paying the $500 monthly rent until the purchase concluded. When 
Garcia had difficulty obtaining financing, he asked defendant Ronald Roberts, a plumbing 
contractor for whom he occasionally worked, if he would be willing to lend the money. Roberts 
orally agreed to pay $132,500 for the property to the Family Trust as a loan; title to the property, 
however, would be put in Roberts’s name and Garcia would pay 12 percent interest (about $1325 
per month) for a period of two years, at the end of which Garcia would have to secure 
independent financing to pay off the loan and receive title. Although the closing costs raised the 
final price to $133,027, Roberts closed escrow on September 26, 2002. Shortly thereafter, 
Roberts invited Garcia and his wife, Omega, to his home to sign paperwork. Roberts’s wife filled 
out (and the parties signed) a form contract entitled “Lease with Option to Purchase,” which Mrs. 
Roberts read and explained, since Johnny Garcia spoke some English but could not read it and 
Omega Garcia did not understand English at all. In 2004, with the assistance of a mortgage 
broker, Garcia cleaned up his credit history and took steps to obtain home insurance while the 
mortgage broker applied for financing and ordered an appraisal. In late August or early 
September, the mortgage broker called Roberts, who confirmed the terms of the sale. The 
mortgage broker also informed Roberts that escrow had been opened and attempted to arrange a 
meeting for signing a purchase agreement required by the lenders. Roberts delayed action 
pending his vacation. On his return, although Roberts eventually met with Garcia and the 
mortgage broker, he postponed signing the purchase agreement until the next day at the title 
office. The next day, Roberts refused to sign the agreement but requested no changes. Roberts 
continued to complain that he did not like the papers and would not sign. On October 26, 2004, 
Roberts told Garcia that he had lost his opportunity to purchase the property.  
Garcia filed suit on December 16, 2004. At the time of trial, on June 25, 2007, the operative 
complaint was premised on the breach of an oral loan agreement. Although Roberts’s pleadings 
originally referred to a written contract, by the time of trial, his position was that there was no 
enforceable or valid oral or written contract. During discovery, Johnny Garcia insisted that the 
only agreement he had with Roberts was the oral agreement; Garcia denied knowing anything 
about a written lease option agreement. On February 7, 2007, Johnny Garcia died; his wife was 
substituted into the case as successor-in-interest and personal representative. At the beginning of 
trial, during the discussion of in limine motions, Garcia’s counsel announced the motion to 
amend to add a breach of contract claim. Thereafter, the motion was formally made, a brief filed 
in support, and substantial oral argument held. Garcia’s counsel acknowledged that Johnny 
Garcia had refused to allow any reference to the written contract. Roberts’s counsel argued that 
the motion was unduly prejudicial because defendants had relied on Johnny Garcia’s repeated 
denials. The trial court granted the motion to amend.  
The court of appeal focused on “the crucial fact that at the time of trial plaintiff was deceased 
and so could not be questioned further on any issues relevant to the lease option agreement.” The 
court of appeal ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the amendment 
because Roberts was unfairly prejudiced by the reversal of position on plaintiff’s part. 
 
